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Abstract:
Using an audit data pseudonymization system as an example, we show how the
APES approach for basic anonymity building blocks can be used to informally evaluate
the design of a given anonymity system. As a by-product we obtain indications of the
usefulness and (in)completeness of the APES building blocks approach.
1 Introduction
Anonymity systems are often designed with a specific application in mind. Various sys-
tems, however, have similar functionality that can be reused for other applications. As a
part of the APES project, De Win et al. [DWND+01] define reusable anonymity build-
ing blocks with minimal, yet useful functionality. This approach has several advantages:
Firstly, similar building blocks can be compared more easily than the more complex sys-
tems they originate from. Secondly, given a list of building blocks with their properties,
deficiencies in existing systems can be identified systematically. Thirdly, anonymity sys-
tems can be designed by systematically composing appropriate building blocks.
We present the APES anonymity building blocks approach in Sect. 2 in more detail. In
Sect. 4 we use it to evaluate the design of a given system [BF00, Fle02] (see Sect. 3)
by decomposing it into building blocks. In doing so we pursue the following goals in
accordance to the above advantages: Firstly, the building blocks used in our design are
compared to different building blocks with similar functionality with the two possible
results: The system design is already composed of building blocks that are optimal for
the given application, or we obtain specific indications how we can improve the design by
replacing some building block with some other building block yielding stronger properties.
Secondly, given the attacker and trust model of the system in Sect. 3 we may identify
deficiencies in the design in an informal way by considering all building blocks in the
supposedly exhaustive list given by De Win et al. [DWND+01]. Thirdly, as a by-product
we obtain indications of the completeness of the list and classifications of APES building
blocks with respect to the given design.
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2 Project APES: Anonymity and Privacy in Electronic Services
In the APES project (Anonymity and Privacy in Electronic Services) the state-of-the-art
of anonymity systems has been surveyed and studied [SDDW+01]. For several of the
applications there exists more than one anonymity system based on different anonymity
techniques. The anonymity techniques themselves are often composed of several sub-
components that are each responsible for a particular aspect of anonymity. In the APES
project the anonymity systems have been decomposed into basic building blocks that
can be reused for different systems, with a focus on unconditional anonymity, i.e. the
anonymity cannot be revoked. The basic building blocks are identified, their properties
and requirements are described, and their security and correctness are evaluated in an in-
formal way [DWND+01]. An overview of the project is given by Diaz, Claessens and
Preneel [DCP03] and in the project deliverables [SDDW+01, DWND+01, DNC+02].
APES basic building blocks are classified as being specific to the connection-level or the
application-level: Connection-level basic building blocks are used to provide anonymous
communication connections, whereas application-level basic building blocks are suppos-
edly application-specific. To obtain a completely anonymous system, application-level
anonymity often needs to be complemented by connection-level anonymity.
Basic building blocks at the connection-level hide or remove identifying information that
is available at that level. Identifying information can occur explicitly like IP addresses in
IP packet headers. Connections can also be traced along the communication path using
implicit features of the appearance or of the flow of the communication. Network packets
can be linked by appearance using e.g. content, format or size. Also the flow of network
packets can be traced using the knowledge about the packet processing regarding e.g. or-
der and timing. Accordingly, APES basic building blocks at the connection-level either
change the appearance or the flow (see the second column of Tab. 1). To provide anony-
mous connections, explicitly as well as implicitly identifying information must be hidden.
Therefore basic building blocks need to be composed to change the appearance as well as
the flow of the messages. The following compositions of basic building blocks to so-called
local setups are proposed:
serial: Building blocks are executed after each other, where the input of the latter block is
the output of the former block.
parallel: Functionally unrelated building blocks can be executed in parallel, given that at
most one building block changes the appearance of the message.
nested: The execution of the outer block is suspended for the execution of the inner
block. This may be required for advanced message transformations or block dependen-
cies [DWND+01].
Basic building blocks at the application-level hide or remove identifying information that
is available at this level. They implement techniques that have been developed to add
anonymity to a particular type of application (see the third column in Tab. 1).
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3 Revisiting Audit Data Pseudonymization
Modern services and operating systems hosting them support the recording of audit data
for various purposes, e.g. security and billing. Since audit data can normally be used with-
out much effort to identify individual users of a system or of a service, recording such data
may conflict with the users’ expectancy for privacy and even with pertinent legislation
concerning personal data of users. Audit data can be pseudonymized after its generation
to avoid the conflict between the desire for security of services and the desire for pri-
vacy of users, in particular accountability and anonymity, respectively. We proposed con-
cepts for the pseudonymization of audit data while balancing the conflicting requirements
for anonymity and accountability [BF00]. Accordingly, we provided an implementation
of pseudonymization, named Pseudo/CoRe, such that users appear under pseudonyms in
Unix audit data, while maintaining the degree of linkability required for audit data analy-
sis [Fle02]. During normal operation only the pseudonymized audit data is analyzed wrt.
misuse suspicions. Only upon good cause shown, i.e. a sufficient misuse suspicion, the
identifying data behind the pseudonyms can be revealed immediately, i.e., accountability
can be established. When related to various other work, our approach exhibits several
advantages, i.a. technical enforcement of purpose binding, the possibility of immediate
reidentification independently of third parties, practicability due to independence of the
user system and of expensive infrastructures such as PKI [Fle03].
Using two architectural models for anonymous authorization and surveillance, Fig. 1 illus-
trates the flow of explicitly identifying (solid arrows) and pseudonymized (dashed arrows)
information as well as the control conditions (fat grey frames) when a user accesses a ser-
vice where identifying data in audit records is replaced with pseudonyms after generation
[Fle03]. Firstly, a user-side management software selects proper credentials that afford
authorization for the desired access. Before access is granted, the credentials are verified
wrt. trust, validity, authenticity and the service access policy. The credentials may con-
tain explicitly identifying information about the user (e.g. account name and password or
X.509 certificates). Also the communication system may reveal identifying information
about the user. In our approach exclusively the identifying information being materialized
in the audit data that is generated during the service access is hidden using pseudonymiza-
tion (see E1 in Fig. 1). Identifying information that is available on the network, during
credential verification or during service access, is assumed not to be available to attackers
that might want to compromise user-identifying data [BF00, Fle02].
Since the responsibilities of the site security officer (SSO) include establishing account-
ability for certain user activities, his interest may conflict with the users’ interest in
anonymity. Therefore the SSO is explicitly precluded from controlling the user’s man-
agement component as well as the service, including credential verification, audit data
generation and pseudonymization (fat dark grey frames). Naturally, in the interest of the
service’s security the user is precluded from controlling the service, including credential
verification, audit data generation and pseudonymization as well as the audit data analysis,
alarm response and reidentification (fat light grey frames). In other words, the fat grey
frames enclose those system components that enforce a specific interest of a given party,
i.e., the dark grey frames stand for the user’s interest in anonymity, whereas the light grey
frames stand for the SSO’s interest in accountability. Obviously, in this model the service,
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Figure 1: Trust and control in the architectural model of our approach
including credential verification, audit data generation and pseudonymization must not be
controlled neither by the user nor by the SSO, but by a third party trusted by the user and
the SSO for the enforcement and a fair balance of their conflicting interests. This third
party may be the organization’s privacy protection official (PPO).
When the audit data has been pseudonymized, it is made available to the SSO (see E2
in Fig. 1), who analyzes the anonymous audit data for suspicions of misuse. If such an
anonymous and sufficient misuse suspicion is found, a response (see E3 in Fig. 1) is gener-
ated, possibly implying to reveal the identifying data behind the pseudonyms (conditional
anonymity) associated with the sufficient misuse suspicion (see R1 and R2 in Fig. 1a). It
is a specific feature of our approach that pseudonyms can be disclosed immediately by
the SSO without further assistance of any other party, if and only if the pseudonyms are
associated with a sufficient misuse suspicion formerly defined by the PPO and recognized
during pseudonymization. Since the reidentification is technically bound to (purposes re-
quiring accountability of) sufficient misuse suspicions, we call this concept technical pur-
pose binding. Technical purpose binding can always be achieved in a domain specific way
only. We denote the domain independent counterpart of this concept as organizational
purpose binding, where the mapping of pseudonyms to identifying information that is
generated during pseudonymization is provided to several persons such that they can only
together perform reidentification (see R1 in Fig. 1b). Each of these persons is responsible
for protecting the interest of only one participating party when reidentification takes place
(see R2 and R3 in Fig. 1b), i.e., the conflict is carried out in the physical world between
these persons. As an example the PPO could look after the interests of the user whereas
the SSO advocates his own interests. It is a disadvantage of this traditional approach that
this process may take too much time for the SSO to be able to react appropriately to a
misuse suspicion. On the other hand this concept is more flexible than the technical pur-
pose binding, which is useful if a misuse suspicion has not been anticipated and defined
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before it occurs. We therefore combine both concepts such that the SSO can perform rei-
dentification timely if a predefined suspicion occurs (technical purpose binding), but if
a suspicion occurs that has not been anticipated before, the SSO depends on the (other)
trusted person(s), to perform reidentification (organizational purpose binding).
Possible attacks on the interests of both, the user and the SSO, result in specific require-
ments for the performance and the throughput of audit data pseudonymization. Firstly, the
path taken by newly generated audit records should be as short as possible to be easily pro-
tectable in order to avoid the disclosure of identifying information of the user. Therefore
audit records should ideally be pseudonymized on the same device where they are gener-
ated, i.e., the device that delivers the service. The response time of the service should not
be unreasonably degraded by the pseudonymization. Secondly, if audit data is generated
on the same device that an attacker is trying to gain control of, to avoid loss of account-
ability the audit data should be transported as quickly as possible to a remote location
that securely stores audit data from possibly various audit components. Therefore, audit
data should ideally be pseudonymized on the fly before transportation. Pseudonymization
should not introduce a significant delay between the generation of an audit record and
its transportation. Specifically, pseudonymization should be able to keep up with the au-
dit data volume generated on the device. In summary, pseudonymization should not use
building blocks that require a high computational complexity and/or introduce a significant
delay [Fle03]. The performance of Pseudo/CoRe has been evaluated and acknowledged to
live up to these requirements [Fle02].
4 Mapping our Approach to Building Blocks
In our approach we assume that the SSO can observe the behavior of service users merely
by inspecting pseudonymized audit data. We also assume that the SSO cannot moni-
tor the user’s service accesses over the network, i.e., the SSO can only see where the
pseudonymized audit data originates. Since this information needs not to be protected,
there are no connection-level anonymity requirements in our approach. If we relax the
latter assumption such that the SSO is able to monitor the user’s service accesses over
the network, the SSO can correlate monitored accesses with pseudonymous audit records.
This situation raises the need for connection-level anonymity which can be implemented
independently from our approach using existing solutions for anonymous connections
(see Seys et al. [SDDW+01]). Fig. 2 shows how our approach can be decomposed into
APES building blocks: Fig. 2a shows the conceptual system [BF00] and Fig. 2b shows
the current Pseudo/CoRe implementation [Fle02]. In the following the description of the
pseudonymization process focuses on the basic building blocks used.
The audit component(s) of the service are configured to generate only audit data required
for sustained service provision, such as audit data indicating misuse (see the building
block filtering as well as the input audit data in Fig. 2). The audit data is delivered to the
pseudonymizer which inspects each incoming audit record for identifying features that, ac-
cording to the PPOs definitions, shall be pseudonymized. Each of those features is replaced
by an optionally padded random string that conforms to the requirements of the given au-
dit data analysis tools wrt. format and content linkability of the feature (see the building
blocks padding 1 and substitution as well as the input random string in Fig. 2). These
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strings are the pseudonyms embedded into the original (application-layer) audit data.
For each feature type the PPO defines a priori the possibilities to disclose the correspond-
ing pseudonyms. If the possibility for disclosure is supported for a given pseudonym,
then the corresponding identifying feature is encrypted, i.e., pseudonym disclosure is
the process of recovering the correct decryption key (see the building block encryption
1 as well as the input random key in Fig. 2). The pairing of the cryptograms of a given
identifying feature together with the message digest of the corresponding decryption key,
i.e. a verifier, forms a pseudonym mapping entry (see the building blocks encryption 1
and one-way function 1 as well as the output pseudonym mapping in Fig. 2a). Only a
positively verified decryption key can be used to correctly decrypt cryptograms of the
respective identifying feature [BF00].
To coarsen the number of actors in the system, dummy entries are added to the pseudonym
mapping. To avoid the linkability of the pseudonym mapping entries over time, they are
padded and reordered [BF00] (see the building blocks dummy generation, padding 2 and
reordering in Fig. 2a). To avoid the inference of the number of real pseudonym mapping
entries based on the number of pseudonym mapping updates, dummy updates are used,
even if no new entries have been inserted into the pseudonym mapping [BF00] (see the
building block dummy updates in Fig. 2a). Note that the description of the pseudonym
mapping and the respective dummy activity applies to the conceptual system depicted in
Fig. 2a only. The implemented system Pseudo/CoRe illustrated in Fig. 2b differs substan-
tially with respect to the pseudonym mapping and dummy activity.
The pseudonymity-layer data contains (among others) information enabling pseudonym
disclosure. It is embedded in special audit records in the format of application-layer au-
dit data (see the output pseudonymity-layer data (including the pseudonym mapping) in
Fig. 2). To be able to use the pseudonym mapping for pseudonym disclosure, a valid de-
cryption key is required. The recovery of such a key from the pseudonymity-layer data is
subject to technical and/or organizational purpose binding. In the conceptual system the
organizational purpose binding is enforced using a threshold cryptosystem to encrypt the
decryption key such that only eligible sets of persons can recover it in cooperation (see
the building block threshold cryptosystem in Fig. 2a). In Pseudo/CoRe the organizational
purpose binding is implemented in a simpler way using a symmetric cryptosystem to en-
force that decryption keys can be recovered with the cooperation of the PPO only (see the
building block encryption 2 in Fig. 2b).
The technical purpose binding is enforced by using threshold schemes for secret sharing
to securely split the decryption key in shares that are provided in the pseudonymity-layer
(see the building block secret sharing schemes in Fig. 2). Misuse scenarios are mainly
modeled using appropriate thresholds for Shamir secret sharing schemes and associating
appropriate misuse contexts and weights with the pseudonyms embedded in observations
of potentially misuse-related activity [BF00]. A valid decryption key can be recovered
from the shares belonging to pseudonyms associated with a given misuse context if and
only if the misuse suspicion is sufficient, i.e., the suspicion level of the misuse context ex-
ceeds the threshold of a secret sharing scheme. Thus, pseudonym disclosure is technically
bound to (purposes requiring accountability of) sufficient misuse suspicions. Since the
above described shares per se are unlinkable, a tentative key recovered from an arbitrary
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combination of these shares could just be invalid. In that case the tentative key does not
match any verifier in the pseudonym mapping (see above and the building block one-way
function 1 in Fig. 2a). Even if the tentative key is valid, it could still represent a mismatch,
i.e., the shares belong to pseudonyms of different identifying features [BF00]. To detect
mismatches, each share is provided with a verifier (see the building block one-way function
2 in Fig. 2a).
The conceptual system supports unlinkable pseudonymity-layer data. Since the com-
putational complexity of selecting unlinkable shares for the recovery of a valid key
discourages practical use, for performance reasons Pseudo/CoRe uses linkability labels
in the pseudonymity-layer [Fle02]. This basic difference has substantial consequences
for the resulting system design. Firstly, since the pseudonymity-layer data is link-
able in Pseudo/CoRe, it would be futile trying to hide the number of actors using the
pseudonym mapping (updates) (note that the corresponding building blocks are missing
in Fig. 2b: dummy generation, padding 2, reordering and dummy updates). Secondly, in
Pseudo/CoRe the linkability labels are used to avoid mismatches during the recovery of
decryption keys. Therefore it is unnecessary to provide a verifier with each share to de-
tect mismatches (note that the building block one-way function 2 is missing in Fig. 2b).
Thirdly, in Pseudo/CoRe the pseudonym mapping is embedded in the pseudonymity-
layer, using the cryptograms of identifying features as linkability labels (see the output
pseudonymity-layer data including the pseudonym mapping in Fig. 2b). As a result, the
cryptograms are directly associated with the shares of the corresponding decryption key.
Hence, accessing the cryptograms requires no search in the pseudonym mapping, such that
there is no need for the verifiers in the pseudonym mapping (note that the corresponding
one-way function 1 building block is missing in Fig. 2b).
The pseudonymization component is complemented by a reidentification component (see
Fig. 1). Our proposed solution and implementation for the reidentification can be decom-
posed into building blocks with analogous results, but does not give any additional and
surprising insights. We therefore do not provide the details here.
5 Considering Building Blocks for Improved Design
The fourth column of Tab. 1 summarizes the building blocks used in our approach, as iden-
tified in Sect. 4. Interestingly, though our approach does not aim at providing connection-
level anonymity, it uses many connection-level building blocks that have not been consid-
ered for application-level anonymity in APES (see also the third column of Tab. 1).
APES primarily aimed at providing building blocks for unconditional anonymity. Excep-
tions are the following building blocks that can be used to provide conditional anonymity:
fair blind signature, group signature, threshold cryptosystem, secret sharing schemes,
pseudonyms, trusted third party. Our approach aims at conditional anonymity and any
given building block on this list is either used by our approach or it could be investigated
for further improvement. Note that our approach does not use any building blocks for sup-
porting conditional anonymity that were not defined for APES. But, our approach uses a
more elementary building block named one-way function enabling to compare features for
equality, while the features are hidden. A collision-resistant one-way function, as in our
implementation a cryptographic hash function, is used to hide the features such that for two
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Table 1: Basic anonymity building blocks used in our approach, ‘?’ = classification missing, ‘—’ =
building block missing
building block connection-level application-level our approach
appearance flow
encryption
√ √ √
padding
√
?
√
substitution
√
?
√
compression
√
reordering
√
?
√
latency
√
dummy activity
√
?
√
no replay
√
filtering
√
?
√
caching
√
broadcast
√ √
multiplexing
√
bulletin board
√ √
one-way function — — —
√
(fair) blind signature √
group signature
√
threshold cryptosystem
√ √
multi-party computation
√
homomorphic encryption
√
deniable encryption
√
secret sharing schemes
√ √
zero-knowledge
√
pseudonyms
√ √
trusted third party
√ √
given features fi and fj if h(fi) = h(fj) then with high probability fi = fj [MvOV97].
For each building block used in our approach we give the anonymity goal to which it con-
tributes, the aspect (appearance or flow) considered by the building block (for connection-
level building blocks only), as well as the effect of the building block that contributes to
the anonymity goal. The basic building blocks are considered in the order of appearance
in Tab. 1; for details on each building block refer to De Win et al. [DWND+01]:
encryption: hide identifying features (appearance) (see encryption 1 in Fig. 2): avoid
linkability using the content of identifying features; organizational purpose binding of
pseudonym disclosure (appearance) (see encryption 2 in Fig. 2b): allow decryption of the
decryption key only in cooperation with the PPO
padding: hide identifying features (appearance) (see padding 1 in Fig. 2): avoid linka-
bility using the size of identifying features; hide the number of actors (appearance) (see
padding 2 in Fig. 2a): avoid linkability using the size of the pseudonym mapping entries
substitution: hide identifying features (appearance) (see substitution in Fig. 2): replace
identifying features by persistent, i.e. linkable, or one-time, i.e. unlinkable, pseudonyms1
reordering: hide the number of actors (flow) (see reordering in Fig. 2a): avoid linkability
using the order of mapping entries
1Note that blanking of identifying features is in general not useful because it can break legacy analysis tools
that rely on the existence of specific features.
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dummy activity: hide the number of actors (flow) (see dummy generation and dummy
updates in Fig. 2a): avoid linkability using the number of mapping entries and mapping
updates
filtering: hide identifying features (flow) (see filtering Fig. 2): discard audit records that
are not needed for analysis
one-way function: hide identifying features (appearance) (see one-way function 1 and
one-way function 2 in Fig. 2a): enable the comparison of decryption keys with tentative
recovered keys while hiding the content of the decryption keys
threshold cryptosystem: organizational purpose binding of pseudonym disclosure (see
threshold cryptosystem in Fig. 2a): allow eligible sets of individuals to decrypt the decryp-
tion keys only cooperatively
secret sharing schemes: technical purpose binding of pseudonym disclosure (see secret
sharing schemes in Fig. 2): allow anyone to recover only decryption keys that are involved
in the transgression of the scheme’s threshold
pseudonyms: hide identifying features (see random string in Fig. 2): the pseudonyms
replacing the identifying features have the following properties [DWND+01]: unauthenti-
cated, sharing is possible, linkable within the context of an attack, forgeable
trusted third party: (un)conditional anonymity (see double fat grey frames in Fig. 1, not
shown in Fig. 2): the PPO can be trusted to properly configure the system components in
the PPO domain
Several building blocks are identified that could not be applied to the current system to-
gether with the respective reasoning:
compression: items to be hidden either are too small or have too high an entropy to be
compressed
no replay: since the channels between the audit components and the pseudonymizer are
trusted, there is no need for the detection of audit record replay
caching: since the channels between the audit components and the pseudonymizer are
uni-directional there is no responder that would need to be hidden
broadcast: no need to hide the identity of the recipient of the audit records (analyzer)
multiplexing: no need to hide the communication path of the audit records
bulletin board: see the broadcast building block
untraceable broadcast: there is no need to hide the identity of the senders of the audit
records (audit-components)
blind signature: does not allow for conditional anonymity with technical purpose binding
deniable encryption: for the current system there seems to be no application
In the following a number of building blocks is identified that could be explored for pos-
sible improvements of the current system. Note, that except for the latency building block
these building blocks are computationally expensive and may not meet the performance
requirements of audit data pseudonymization (see Sect. 3).
latency: could be used instead of dummy pseudonym mapping updates if many new
pseudonym mapping entries are created
fair blind signature: could be explored to provide technical purpose binding while re-
ducing the power of the trusted third party
group signature: could be explored to be used for conditional anonymity with organiza-
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tional purpose binding; though, its computational complexity is much higher than that of
threshold cryptosystems [DWND+01]
multi-party computation, homomorphic encryption: for certain applications not only
the application-layer audit data may be analyzed, but also certain properties of the
pseudonymity-layer data may be exploited during analysis, independently of pseudonym
disclosure; cryptographic primitives for multi-party computation and for homomorphic
encryption could be explored for the generation of pseudonymity-layer data that has the
desired properties
zero-knowledge: could be explored to provide a proof of validity for pseudonyms to re-
duce the power of the trusted third party
pseudonyms: other pseudonym systems could be explored to reduce the power of the
trusted third party while gaining the following additional pseudonym properties: authenti-
cated, sharing is impossible, unforgeable
6 Conclusion
We revisited the design of a pseudonymizer using the APES approach of basic anonymity
building blocks with two goals: informally identifying room for improvement and infor-
mally identifying deficiencies in the design. Regarding the first goal, we identified the
latency connection-level building block that could be used as an alternative to dummy ac-
tivity under specific circumstances. We identified six further application-level building
blocks that could be explored to further reduce the power of the trusted third party in our
approach in order to obtain more useful properties of the pseudonyms or to replace the
threshold cryptosystem or to support the exploitation of the pseudonymity-layer for the
application-specific analysis. Though, probably none of the candidate building blocks will
satisfy the requirements regarding computational complexity or delay. As a result, given
the APES building blocks list, the current design may only be improved if some of the
current requirements are relaxed, trading off stronger mechanisms against time or compu-
tational complexity. With respect to the second goal, and given the APES building blocks
list, we could not identify any deficiencies in our design.
Our experience in the exercise of decomposing a given system into basic building blocks
provides some indications about the APES approach: It is possible to analyze a given sys-
tem design using APES basic building blocks. The analysis may stimulate improvement
of the design and may point out weaknesses in the design. The statements regarding these
two goals are the stronger, the more complete the list of building blocks considered is.
Though De Win et al. claim to present an exhaustive list of building blocks for uncondi-
tional anonymity [DWND+01], it seems rather unlikely that future developments will not
contribute new building blocks for unconditional anonymity. In fact, in our approach and
for various purposes we found the necessity to compare features that need to be hidden.
This can be achieved using one-way functions. Surely, one-way functions are already part
of several APES building blocks. Anyway, they are also very useful as such for various
applications without the functionality of the building blocks in which they are contained.
We thus postulate the application-level building block named one-way function. This is an
indication, that the list of APES building blocks is probably not exhaustive. As a result,
we cannot even informally exclude that there exist better designs for our pseudonymizer
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or that the design may have deficiencies. The above statements about the quality of our
design merely express strong indications based on the current state of knowledge.
In addition to the incompleteness of the list of building blocks we found that the clas-
sification of building blocks regarding the level of their use is also incomplete, i.e., five
connection-level building blocks were used at the application-level, in spite of the APES
classification. Further investigation might show that (nearly) all connection-level building
blocks can also be useful at the application-level. As a last note, we found that the given
building blocks for conditional anonymity were sufficient to build our solution, though
APES so far was focused on building blocks for unconditional anonymity, i.e., the given
building blocks may be perfectly sufficient to build systems for conditional anonymity.
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